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We examine integration strategies of multinational ﬁrms that face a rich array of
choices of international organization. Each ﬁrm in an industry must provide headquarter
services from its home country, produce intermediate inputs, and assemble the interme-
diate goods into ﬁnal products. Both production of intermediate goods and assembly
can be performed at home, in another “Northern” country, in the low-wage “South,” or
in several of these locations. We study the equilibrium choices of ﬁrms that diﬀer in
productivity (and thus size), focusing on the role of industry characteristics such as the
ﬁxed costs of foreign subsidiaries, the cost of transporting intermediate and ﬁnal goods,
and the share of the consumer market that resides in the South in determining optimal
integration strategies.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The globalization process of recent years has been expressed in the growth of many types
of international transactions, but few more salient than the expansion in the activity of
multinational ﬁrms. The growth rate of sales by foreign aﬃliates of multinational corporations
outpaced the growth of exports of goods and non-factor services by almost seven percent per
year from 1990 to 2001. Gross product by all foreign aﬃliates accounted for an estimated
eleven percent of world GDP in 2001, while exports by these aﬃliates represented an estimated
35 percent of total world trade (UNCTAD, 2002).
Multinational ﬁrms have pursued a multitude of strategies for international expansion,
as described in the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 1998) and cited by Yeaple (2003).
Firms have opened foreign aﬃliates to perform activities ranging from R&D to after-sales
service, and including production of parts and components, assembly, and wholesale and retail
distribution, among others. Some ﬁrms procure parts from subsidiaries in many countries and
assemble them in a single location. Others concentrate production of parts in one place and
assemble ﬁnal products in several plants located close to their customers. Still others erect
an integrated plant in a low-wage country and use it to serve consumers around the globe.
The motives for foreign direct investment (FDI) are similarly diverse, but the potential for
factor-cost savings, for transportation-cost and trading-cost savings, and for the realization
of economies of scale seem to be among the primary inducements.
The theory of international trade and foreign direct investment traditionally has distin-
guished two forms of multinational activ i t yb a s e do na l t e r n a t i v er e a s o n sw h yaﬁrm might opt
to locate production or other activities abroad (see, for example, Markusen [2002, pp.17-20]).
Vertical multinationals are ﬁrms that geographically separate various stages of production.
Such fragmentation of the production process typically is motivated by cost considerations
arising from cross-country diﬀerences in technologies or factor prices. For example, Helpman
(1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) model multinational ﬁrms that maintain their
headquarters in one country but manufacture output in another in order to conserve on
production costs. In contrast, horizontal multinationals are ﬁrms that replicate most or all
of the production process in several locations. These multi-plant ﬁrms often are motivated
by potential savings of transport and trading costs. In the models developed by Markusen
(1984), Brainard (1997) and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000), for example, ﬁrms with
headquarters in a home country produce ﬁnal output in plants that serve consumers in each
of two national markets.
The distinction between vertical and horizontal FDI is clear enough when there are two
countries and two production activities, namely headquarter operations and “manufacturing.”
But with more countries and more stages of production, some organizational forms do not ﬁt
neatly into either of these categories. For example, a multinational ﬁrm might manufacture
goods in a foreign subsidiary and sell the output primarily in third-country markets; Ekholm
2et al. (2003) term such activity “export-platform FDI.” Or a ﬁrm might perform intermediate
stages of production in one country to save on production costs and subsequent stages in
several plants to conserve on transport costs. Yeaple (2003) follows the World Investment
Report in referring to this as a “complex integration strategy.” Feinberg and Keane (2003)
report that, in their sample of U.S. multinationals with aﬃliates in Canada, only 12 percent
of the ﬁrms have negligible intra-ﬁrm ﬂows of intermediate goods and thus can be considered
to be purely horizontal multinationals, while only 19 percent of the ﬁrms have intra-ﬁrm
ﬂows of intermediate goods in only one direction, which would make them purely vertical
multinationals. The remaining 69 percent of ﬁrms are what they call “hybrids”; i.e., ﬁrms
that are pursuing more complex integration strategies. Similarly, Hanson et al. (2001)
describe the rich patterns of FDI they ﬁnd in their data pertaining to operations by U.S.
multinationals and their foreign aﬃliates. They document and analyze the roles played by
foreign aﬃliates as export platforms, as producers adding value to inputs acquired from their
U.S. parents, and as wholesale distributors in foreign markets. Based on their analysis of data
for the 1990’s, Hanson et al. conclude that “the literature’s benchmark distinction between
horizontal and vertical FDI does not capture the range of strategies that multinationals use.”
Both Yeaple (2003) and Ekholm et al. (2003) examine theoretically the determinants of
ﬁrms’ choices among a limited set of integration strategies that includes an option for FDI
that is neither purely horizontal nor purely vertical. Yeaple studies a model with two identical
“Northern” countries and a third, “Southern” country in which ﬁrms headquartered in one of
the Northern countries need two produced inputs to assemble diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods. One
component can be produced more cheaply in the North, the other in the South. Shipping
entails an “iceberg” transport cost that is a similar proportion of output for intermediate
g o o d sa sf o rﬁnal goods. All consumption of the diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods takes place in the
North. In this context, Yeaple compares the proﬁtability of four integration strategies: (i) a
“national ﬁrm” that produces both of the components in the same Northern country as where
its headquarters are located; (ii) a “vertical multinational” that produces one component in
the South and the other in the ﬁrm’s home country; (ii) a “horizontal multinational” that
maintains integrated production facilities (that produce both components) in both Northern
countries, and (iv) a “complex multinational” that produces one component in the South and
the other in both Northern countries. In Yeaple’s model of symmetric producers, all ﬁrms
adopt the same integration strategy in equilibrium. Yeaple shows how the viability of the
four diﬀerent organizational forms depends on factor-price diﬀerentials, shipping costs, and
the ﬁxed costs of establishing subsidiaries in the North and South.
Ekholm et al. (2003) also study a setting with two similar Northern countries and a single
Southern country. Theirs is a duopoly model, with one ﬁrm headquartered in each country in
the North. Each of these ﬁrms must produce an intermediate good in its home country but
may assemble their ﬁnal output in one or more plants located in any or all of the countries.
3Thus, each ﬁrm chooses among four options: (i) a national ﬁrm that conducts all activities at
home, (ii) a purely horizontal multinational that assembles in both Northern countries; (iii)
a pure export platform, with all assembly in the South; and (iv) a hybrid multinational, with
assembly in both the home country and the South. Like Yeaple, Ekholm at al. examine how
the organizational choices reﬂect transport costs, the relative cost advantage of the South,
and the ﬁxed costs associated with foreign investment.
Our concerns in this paper are somewhat similar to those of Yeaple (2003) and Ekholm et
al. (2003), but we aim to shed light on the determinants of integration strategy when ﬁrms
face a richer array of choices. Our goal is to provide a reasonably general analysis in which a
variety of diﬀerent complex integration strategies cane m e r g ei ne q u i l i b r i u m . I no u rm o d e l ,
as with the others, there are three countries; namely, two, symmetric Northern countries
that we call “East” and “West” and a low-wage country that we call “South.” In contrast
to the earlier papers, we allow for consumption of the diﬀerentiated products produced by
integrated ﬁrms in all three locations. Thus, the relative size of the Southern market becomes
an important parameter in our analysis. The ﬁrms that produce diﬀerentiated products must
perform two production activities besides their headquarter services; they ﬁrst must produce
intermediate goods and then must assemble the intermediates into a ﬁnal product. Either
production of intermediate goods, or assembly, or both may be separated geographically from
a ﬁrm’s headquarters, and a ﬁrm may perform these activities in one or several locations.
As in Yeaple (2003), there are interesting complementarities that link the location decisions.
We assume in our analysis that the prospective labor costs of producing intermediate
goods and assembling them are lower in the South than in the North. A ﬁrm must bear a
ﬁxed cost for each plant it operates abroad to produce intermediate goods and a (possibly
diﬀerent) ﬁxed cost for each foreign subsidiary that assembles ﬁnal goods. Both intermediate
goods and ﬁnal goods may be costly to trade, and the cost of transporting the two types
of goods (relative to the value of output) need not be the same. The key parameters that
we use to describe an industry are the sizes of the transport costs for intermediate and ﬁnal
goods, the relative size of the ﬁxed costs for diﬀerent types of subsidiaries, and the share of
the consumer market that resides in the South.
We also allow for heterogeneity among the ﬁrms in an industry. Following Melitz (2002)
and Helpman et al. (2003), we assume that each entrant into an industry draws a productivity
level from a known distribution. By the time that ﬁrms make their decisions about integration
strategy, they have learned about their own potential productivity levels. In equilibrium,
ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels may make diﬀerent choices about their organizational
form. Thus, our model can account for the coexistence of a variety of forms in the same
industry, in keeping with the evidence reported by Hanson et al. (2001) and Feinberg and
Keane (2003). Moreover, our analysis draws a link between the size of a ﬁrm and its
equilibrium integration strategy. In principal, these predictions can be subjected to empirical
4scrutiny.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our model
of ﬁrms that must choose where to produce intermediate goods and where to assemble ﬁnal
products. The ﬁrms in an industry share similar ﬁxed costs of opening foreign subsidiaries,
similar costs of shipping components, and similar costs of shipping ﬁnal goods. They face
symmetric demands but diﬀer in their potential productivity. In Section 3, we analyze
the equilibrium integration strategies that emerge in the absence of transport costs. In this
simple case we are able to develop intuition about the sorting of ﬁrms by productivity level
and show how the parameters describing ﬁxed costs and the relative size of the South aﬀect
the choices of organizational form. In Section 4, we introduce transportation costs for ﬁnal
goods and consider the full range of possible costs from low to high. Again we examine how
diﬀerent parameters describing industry conditions color the equilibrium choices by ﬁrms
with diﬀerent productivity levels. Section 5 contains a discussion of some interesting cases
that arise when intermediate goods too are costly to transport. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We seek a simple setting in which ﬁrms face a choice between performing activities at home
and engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) to conserve on either production costs or
trading costs. We also need to distinguish between “assembly activities”–those that result
in a ﬁnished product ready for sale to consumers –and “intermediate activities”–those that
can be performed in any location so long as the output later is transported to the place of
assembly. For this, we develop a model with three countries and two stages of production.
Following Ekholm et al. (2003) and Yeaple (2003), we assume that one of the countries
(‘South’) has low production costs and a relatively small market for the goods produced by
the integrated ﬁrms, while the other two (‘East’ and ‘West’, together comprising the ‘North’)
have larger markets, higher wages, and are fully symmetric.
Households consume goods produced by J +1industries. One industry supplies a homo-
geneous good under competitive conditions. The others manufacture diﬀerentiated products.
Consumers share similar preferences that can be represented by the utility function
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where x0 is consumption of the homogeneous good and Xj is an index of consumption of the
diﬀerentiated outputs of industry j ∈ {1,...,J}. The consumption index for industry j is a






, 0 <α j < 1,( 2 )
5where xj(i) is consumption of the ith variety of industry j and nj is the measure (number)
of varieties in that industry. With this utility function, the elasticity of substitution between
any pair of goods produced by industry j is 1/(1 − αj). W ea s s u m et h a tαj >µ j,s ot h a t
the brands in a given industry substitute more closely for one another than they do for the
outputs of a diﬀerent industry.
We distinguish the countries in several ways. First, ﬁrms in the North are more productive
than those in the South in producing the homogeneous good. This creates a gap between
Northern and Southern equilibrium wages. We assume that one unit of labor is needed to
produce one unit of the homogenous good in East or West, but that 1/w > 1 units of labor are
needed to produce one unit of the good in South. We also assume that the homogeneous good
is produced in the equilibrium in all three countries and take this good to be the numeraire.
Then wE = wW =1>w S = w,w h e r ew  is the wage in country  . Second, the sizes of the
markets for diﬀerentiated products may diﬀer; we denote by M  the number of households
in country   who consume diﬀerentiated products, and assume that ME = MW = MN.1
Finally, we assume that ﬁrms can enter as producers of diﬀerentiated products only in the
Northern countries and that these ﬁrms must locate their headquarters in their country of
origin.
Entry into industry j requires hj units of local labor in East or West. With this fee,
entrants acquire the design for a diﬀerentiated product and learn their productivity level,
θ. Productivity levels in industry j are independent draws from a cumulative distribution
function, Gj(θ).A ﬁrm in industry j with productivity θ produces ﬁnal output according
to the production function θFj(m,a), where m is the quantity of a specialized, intermediate
input and a is the level of assembly activity. The intermediate goods can be produced apart
from the assembly activity, but if so, the intermediates must be shipped to the place of
assembly before a ﬁnal good can be produced. The location of assembly determines the
(pre-shipment) location of the ﬁnal good.
We take Fj(·) to be an increasing and concave function with constant returns to scale
and an elasticity of substitution between m and a no greater than one. Let cj(pm,p a) denote
the unit cost function dual to Fj(m,a), where pi is the eﬀective price of input i in the place
of assembly (including delivery costs). Then cj(pm,p a)/θ i st h ep e r - u n i tv a r i a b l ec o s to f
production in this location for a ﬁrm with productivity θ.
A ﬁrm in industry j that separates the production of intermediate inputs from the location
of its headquarters bears an extra (ﬁxed) cost of gj units of home labor for communication
and governance. These costs are the same for a ﬁrm that produces the intermediates in the
other Northern country as for one that produces them in the South. Similarly, a ﬁrm that
engages in FDI in assembly incurs an extra ﬁxed cost of fj units of home labor no matter
1We do not necessarily associate the number of consumers of diﬀerentiated products with the size of a
country’s population. There may be some consumer who lack suﬃcient income to consume these products
and who instead concentrate their purchases on the homogeneous good.
6where the assembly takes place. Iceberg transportation costs may exist for both intermediate
inputs and ﬁnal goods. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm in industry j must ship τj ≥ 1 units of the
intermediate good to deliver one unit of the good to a distant place of assembly and tj ≥ 1
units of the ﬁnal good to deliver one unit of the good to a distant place of consumption.
We assume that the manufacture of one unit of an intermediate good requires one unit
of local labor in the place of production and that one unit of assembly activity requires one
unit of local labor in the place of assembly. With these assumptions, the South enjoys a
comparative advantage both in assembly and in production of intermediate goods relative to
production of the homogeneous good x0.2
It is now straightforward to calculate the variable cost to a ﬁrm in industry j of delivering
one unit of the ﬁnal good to a given market by means of alternative integration strategies.
Consider for example a ﬁrm in East with productivity θ that wishes to deliver ﬁnal goods to
consumers in West. Such a ﬁrm would pay tjcj(1,1)/θ per unit to produce and assemble the
good at home (including the cost of shipping to West), whereas it would pay tjcj(w,w)/θ
per unit to conduct all production and assembly activity in South. Still another possibility
would be to produce intermediates in South and perform assembly in West, thereby avoiding
the transport cost for ﬁnal goods. The variable cost associated with this strategy would be
cj(τjw,1)/θ per unit, considering the cost of shipping the intermediates from South to West.
3 Zero Transport Costs
W eb e g i nw i t ht h ec a s ei nw h i c hi n t e r m e d i a t ea n dﬁnal goods can be shipped between coun-
tries at zero cost. It is helpful to examine this simple case ﬁrst, because it highlights the
trade-oﬀ between the ﬁxed costs of FDI and the variable-cost savings that can be achieved
by performing certain activities in the low-wage South (as in Helpman et al. [2003]), as well
as the complementarities between FDI decisions for diﬀerent stages of development (as in
Yeaple [2003]).
In what follows, we consider ﬁrms in a particular industry j and omit the subscript j from
the variables and parameters of interest. We focus on the variation across ﬁrms in productivity
levels, as indexed by θ.T h eﬁrms under consideration may have their headquarters in East
or West. Since these two countries are fully symmetric, it is more convenient to refer to
H, the home country of the ﬁrm in question, and R, the “other” Northern country in which
the ﬁrm will sell its output. This means, of course, that if H = E, R = W; and if H = W,
R = E.
With zero transport costs, the integrated ﬁrm never opts to produce its intermediate goods
2We have also examined situations with diﬀerent production structures that admit a comparative advantage
for the South in one of the activities undertaken by the integrated ﬁrms. For small comparative advantage in
one of these activities, our results are unaﬀected. Larger degrees of comparative advantage modify our result
in fairly intuitive ways.
7Table 1: Fixed and Per-Unit Variable Costs
production m assembly a ﬁxed cost per-unit variable cost
in H in H 0 c(1,1)/θ
in H in S f c(1,w)/θ
in S in H g c(w,1)/θ
in S in S f + g c(w,w)/θ
or conduct assembly operations in country R, because the variable costs are the same in R as
in H and FDI imposes extra ﬁxed costs. Moreover, a ﬁrm has no reason to undertake a given
activity in two locations, as this would impose extra governance costs without conserving on
any transport costs. Thus, four integration strategies remain for consideration: production
of intermediates might take place either in H or S and assembly might occur either in H
or S.T a b l e 1 s h o w s t h e ﬁxed and per-unit variable costs associated with each of the four
strategies. The ﬁxed costs indicated are those extra costs that result from operating one or
more foreign subsidiaries.
The ﬁrst row depicts a strategy of home production. With this strategy, the ﬁrm serves
the foreign markets in R and S with exports from its home assembly plant. As is clear, this
strategy provides for a low ﬁxed cost, as it avoids the extra costs associated with FDI. But
the per-unit variable cost is high, because factor prices are higher in E or W than in S.
The following two rows depict strategies of “partial globalization”; either intermediates are
produced at home and assembled in South (second row), or vice versa (third row). These
strategies yield intermediate levels of ﬁxed and variable costs; they cannot be ranked vis-à-
vis one another without further information about the cost function c(·) and the sizes of the
ﬁxed costs for the two types of foreign subsidiaries. With assembly in S,t h eﬁrm exports
intermediates from its home plant, and then exports ﬁnished goods from S to consumers in H
and R. This means that the strategy combines elements of “vertical FDI” and what Ekholm
et al. (2003) have termed “export-platform FDI.” With intermediates produced in S,t h e r e
again is intra-ﬁrm trade, as well as exports of ﬁnal goods from H to markets in R and S.T h e
bottom row depicts a strategy of complete globalization, whereby all production activities
are performed in the low-wage South. Here, ﬁxed costs are highest, variable costs are lowest,
and the markets in H and R are served by exports from South. With this strategy, there is
no trade in intermediate goods.
We can readily compare the operating proﬁts that a ﬁrm with productivity θ can achieve
under the alternative strategies. Considering the form of consumer preferences in (1) and
(2), every ﬁrm in the industry faces a demand function in market   given by
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Figure 1: Proﬁtability of Home Production and Complete Globalization
where X  is the aggregate consumption index for varieties in the industry in country   and
p  is the price it charges there. Each producer treats the aggregate consumption indexes as
given. Therefore, it maximizes proﬁts by charging a price in each market that is a multiple
1/α of its per-unit variable cost of serving that market. Since the per-unit cost of serving each
market is the same when transport costs are zero, so too are the optimal prices associated
with a given strategy. It follows from the demand function in (3) that, for any strategy with
an extra ﬁxed cost of k and a per-unit variable cost of c/θ, the maximum attainable operating
proﬁts are
π =( 1− α)¯ Y Θc−α/(1−α) − k,
where Θ ≡ θα/(1−α) is another measure of the ﬁrm’s productivity and ¯ Y ≡
P
M  ¡
X ¢(µ−α)/(1−α) is a measure of the size of the world market.
In Figure 1, we depict the operating proﬁts attainable from home production (the top row
in Table 1) and complete globalization in South (the bottom row in Table 1), for diﬀerent
levels of productivity Θ. These proﬁts, which we denote by πH,H and πS,S,a r eg i v e nb y
πH,H =





(1 − α)¯ Y Θ
C(w,w)
− (f + g) (5)
respectively, where C(pm,p a) ≡ [c(pm,p a)]α/(1−α) is a transformed measure of unit cost. The
ﬁgure shows that ﬁrms with low productivity prefer home production whereas ﬁrms with
9high productivity prefer FDI, in keeping with the ﬁndings of Helpman et al. (2003). The
reason, of course, is that FDI oﬀers the prospect of lower per-unit costs and higher ﬁxed
costs, and the potential to save on variable cost is most valuable to highly productive ﬁrms
that anticipate producing high volumes of output.
Next consider the ﬁrm’s option to locate only assembly operations in South, while pro-
ducing intermediate goods in the home country. The potential operating proﬁts from this
integration strategy for a ﬁrm with productivity Θ are
πH,S =
(1 − α)¯ Y Θ
C(1,w)
− f .( 6 )
If we were to add πH,S to Figure 1, it would have an intercept between those of πH,H and πS,S
and a slope steeper than πH,H but less steep than πS,S. Thus, if locating only assembly in
South is to be viable at any productivity level, this strategy must be at least as proﬁtable as
concentrating both activities in either location at the productivity level labelled Θ(HH,SS)











Leaving this strategy aside for a moment, the ﬁrm also has the option to produce inter-
mediate goods in South and assemble ﬁnal goods at home. This strategy oﬀers a ﬁrm with
productivity Θ operating proﬁts of
πS,H =
(1 − α)¯ Y Θ
C(w,1)
− g .( 8 )
Again, the intercept and slope are intermediate between those for the two lines shown in
Figure 1, and viability of the strategy requires that it be at least as proﬁtable as the other











From (7) and (9) we conclude that no ﬁrm will separate the production of its intermediate


















Our assumption that the elasticity of substitution between intermediates and assembly in
the production of ﬁnal goods is no greater than one ensures that the upper limit in this
3To derive this condition, we calculate Θ(HH,SS) as the value of Θ that equates πH,H and πS,S,a n dt h e n
compare πH,S and πH,H at Θ = Θ(HH,SS).
10string of inequalities exceeds the lower limit.4 It follows that there always exist a range of
values of g/f for which neither assembly in South and production of intermediates at home,
nor production of intermediates in South with assembly at home is optimal for any ﬁrm,
regardless of its productivity level.
Suppose now that the ﬁxed costs of operating a foreign assembly operation are small
relative to the ﬁxed costs of operating a foreign plant to manufacture intermediate goods;
i.e., g/f is large enough so that (7) is satisﬁed. Then a ﬁrm with productivity level at or near
Θ(HH,SS) prefers to locate its assembly in South and manufacture intermediates at home to
any other integration strategy. Figure 2 shows the operating proﬁts πH,S (as well as πH,H and
πS,S) for this case. Clearly, ﬁrms with low productivity below Θ(HH,HS) conduct all oper-
ations at home, ﬁrms with intermediate productivity between Θ(HH,HS) and Θ(HS,SS)
conduct only their assembly operations in South, and ﬁrms with high productivity above
Θ(HS,SS) perform all of their production activities in South.
The case when the ﬁxed cost of FDI in assembly is large relative to the ﬁxed cost of FDI
in intermediates is qualitatively similar. With g/f small enough so that (9) is satisﬁed, the
line representing πS,H will cut πH,H at some relatively low productivity level Θ(HH,SH)
that is to the left of Θ(HH,SS) in Figure 1, and will cut πS,S at some relatively high
productivity level Θ(SH,SS) to the right of Θ(HH,SS) in the ﬁgure. Then ﬁrms with
productivity between Θ(HH,SH) and Θ(SH,SS) will choose to produce their intermediates
in the low-wage South while conducting assembly at home.
Our analysis can be used to highlight one form of complementarity that exists between a
ﬁrm’s decision to invest abroad at diﬀerent stages of production. Compare, for example, a
ﬁrm’s decision whether to conduct assembly in South when g =0and g = ∞.I nt h eﬁrst case,
the ﬁxed cost of FDI in intermediate goods is nil and so all ﬁrms produce their intermediates
in South. In the second case, the cost of FDI for the production of intermediates is prohibitive
and all ﬁrms produce their intermediates at home. When g =0 , the productivity level at



























i.e., if and only if the function 1/C(·) is supermodular. But 1/C(pm,p a) ≡ [c(pm,p a)]
α/(1−α) is supermodular











The left-hand side of this inequality is the elasticity of substitution between m and a in the production of ﬁnal
goods, which is no greater than one by assumption. Therefore, the inequality holds for all positive values of
α.
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Figure 2: Partial globalization optimal for intermediate productivity levels
which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between assembly at home and assembly in South is
Θ(SH,SS)=
f






whereas when g = ∞, the productivity level at which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between assembly
at home and assembly in South is
Θ(HH,HS)=
f






In footnote 5 we showed that 1/C(·) is supermodular when, as here, the elasticity of substitu-
tion between intermediates and assembly does not exceed one. It follows that Θ(SH,SS) <
Θ(HH,HS);i . e . ,ﬁrms will shift their assembly abroad for a wider range of productivity levels
when they also produce their intermediates there than when they produce their intermediates
at home.
Figure 3 can be used to summarize the arguments up to now. It shows the integration
s t r a t e g i e sc h o s e nb yd i ﬀerent ﬁrms (as indexed by their productivity Θ)f o rd i ﬀerent values
of g/(f + g).I n d r a w i n g t h i s ﬁgure, we hold constant the measure of world demand (as
represented by ¯ Y ) and the combined ﬁxed costs of FDI (as represented by f + g).5
For all strictly positive values of g/(f +g), low-productivity ﬁrms in an industry perform
all stages of production at home and export their ﬁnal product to R and S.T h e s e ﬁrms
5If ¯ Y increases or f + g decreases, the boundaries between the various regions shift to the right, because











Figure 3: Integration Strategies for Diﬀerent Productivities and Relative Fixed Costs
intend to produce relatively little output, so the savings in variable cost oﬀered by FDI does
not justify the higher ﬁxed costs. Firms with intermediate levels of productivity may separate
their production of intermediates from their assembly operations, depending on the relative
sizes of f and g.I f s o , s u c h ﬁrms will engage in intra-ﬁrm trade in addition to exporting
ﬁnal output either from their home assembly plant or from an export platform in South.
Finally, high-productivity ﬁrms will perform all operations in the low-wage South so as to
take greatest advantage of the low per-unit costs there.
Before leaving this section, we show how the model can be closed to construct an industry
equilibrium. We deﬁne the envelope of the proﬁt functions as
π(Θ)= m a x
z1∈{H,S},z2∈{H,S}
πz1,z2(Θ) ,
where π(Θ) is the operating proﬁte a r n e db yaﬁrm with productivity Θ when it pursues its
optimal integration strategy. Given the distribution of productivity levels G(θ), the free-entry








Since the proﬁt function is increasing in the measure of world demand ¯ Y , which in turn is in-
creasing in the aggregate consumption index X, the free-entry condition uniquely determines
the industry value for X. All other industry variables, including the number of varieties and
the cut-oﬀ points for each integration strategy can now be computed using this value of X.
134 Transport Costs for Final Goods
In this section, we allow for costly transport of ﬁnal goods, while maintaining the assumption
that intermediates can be shipped costlessly. For example, the intermediates may represent
services that can be performed remotely and then moved electronically. This assumption
implies that intermediates goods are only produced in one location.
When the transport of ﬁnal goods is costly, relative market size may aﬀect the location
of assembly operations. Moreover, ﬁrms may engage in “horizontal FDI,” by, for example,
assembling goods in more than one location. We focus here on the interaction between market
size and FDI costs in determining a ﬁrm’s optimal integration strategy.
4.1 Low Transport Costs
The viable integration strategies vary with the size of transport costs. We begin with a case





When inequality (10) is satisﬁed, the variable cost of serving any market is minimized by
assembly in South, no matter where the intermediate goods are produced. To see this,
observe ﬁrst that if the intermediates are produced in H or R,t h ec o s to fs e r v i n ga n ym a r k e t
from an assembly plant in the North is at least c(1,1). But this exceeds the cost of serving the
same market from the South, which is at most tc(1,w). Next observe that if intermediates are
produced in South, the per-unit variable cost of serving any market from an assembly plant
in the North is at least c(w,1), while the per-unit cost of serving the same market from a
plant in South is at most tc(w,w). However, c(w,1)/c(w,w) >c (1,1)/c(1,w),6 so inequality
(10) ensures that c(w,1) >t c (w,w) as well.
Under the circumstances, a ﬁrm with headquarters in H will not conduct any activity
in R. Intermediate goods are no less costly to produce in R than in H and can be shipped
costlessly from one to the other. By producing these goods in R,t h eﬁrm would needlessly
incur an extra ﬁxed cost of FDI. And if assembly is to be conducted outside of H,t h e
delivered cost of serving any market from S are lower than the cost of serving the market
from R,w h i l et h eﬁxed cost of an assembly plant is the same in the two locations.
We can also rule out any integration strategy in which a given activity is performed in more
than one location. If it is worthwhile for the ﬁrm to bear the ﬁxed cost of opening a facility
to manufacture intermediate goods in South, the ﬁrm produces all of its intermediates there
to take full advantage of the low production costs. The same is true for assembly, considering
6Note that c(1,1)/c(1,w) <c (1,w)/c(w,w) if and only if logc(1,1)+logc(w,w) < logc(1,w)+logc(w,1);
i.e., if and only if logc(pm,p a) is submodular. But logc(pm,p a) indeed is submodular when the elasticity of
substitution between m and a is less than one, because ∂
2 logc(pm,p a)/∂pm∂pa < 1.
14the reasonably low cost of shipping goods. It follows that each ﬁrm chooses one of four
integration strategies; these are the same set of strategies that we considered in Section 3.
A ﬁrm’s decision calculus is similar to that described in Section 3, except that now it must
take into account the relative size of the market in South when deciding whether to open
facilities there. We deﬁne Y   ≡ M (X )(µ−α)/(1−α) as a measure of market size in country  
and σ ≡ Y S/¯ Y as the share of the South in world demand for industry output.
We begin, as before, by comparing the proﬁtability of performing all production activities
at home with the proﬁtability of performing all stages in South. Again, ﬁrms with low
productivity prefer home production while those with high productivity prefer FDI in South.
The productivity level Θ(HH,SS) at which a ﬁrm earns equal operating proﬁts under the
alternative integration strategies depends, as before, on the size of the ﬁxed costs, f + g,
and on the relative wage, w. Now it depends too on the shipping cost and on the relative
size of South. If the typical market in the North is larger than the market in South (i.e., if
Y E = Y W = Y N >YS), then a larger shipping cost t diminishes the relative proﬁtability of
production in South, because the shipments from S to H and S to R, under this strategy are
larger respectively than those from H to S and from H to R under the alternative strategy
of home production. It follows that the larger is t, the greater is the productivity level that
makes a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between production in home and complete globalization in South.7
On the other hand, the larger is σ,t h es m a l l e ri sΘ(HH,SS), because the relative proﬁtability
of producing in South increases with the size of the market there due to the transport costs.
Again, as was the case with zero transport costs, a strategy of producing intermediate
goods at home with assembly in South can be optimal for some ﬁrms only if the ﬁxed cost of
FDI in intermediate-good production is high relative to the ﬁx e dc o s to faf o r e i g na s s e m b l y
operation. And a strategy of producing intermediate goods in South with assembly at home
can be optimal for some ﬁrms only if the ﬁxed cost of FDI in intermediate-good production
is relatively low compared to that for a foreign assembly operation. For intermediate values
of g/f, all low-productivity ﬁrms produce their intermediates and conduct assembly at home
while all high-productivity ﬁrms produce their intermediates and conduct assembly in South.
Figure 4 shows the optimal integration strategies for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity













where T ≡ tα/(1−α) is a transformed measure of transport costs for ﬁnal goods. Here, ﬁrms
with productivity below some Θ(HH,HS) will conduct all activity at home, ﬁrms with
intermediate productivity between Θ(HH,HS) and Θ(HS,SS) will produce intermediates
7We provide the algebraic expressions and more detailed arguments to support this and other claims made
in this section in the appendix.
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Figure 4: Optimal integration strategies when t is small and g/f is large
at home and assemble in South, and ﬁrms with productivity above Θ(HS,SS) will perform all
production activities in South. The ﬁgure shows that Θ(HH,HS) is a decreasing function
of σ, inasmuch as assembly in the South is more proﬁtable when the Southern market is
relatively large. Also, Θ(HS,SS) is a decreasing function of σ for reasons that are a bit more
subtle. Comparing a strategy that has only assembly performed in South with a strategy that
has all production in South, the latter provides lower unit costs and therefore larger volumes
of output. With larger volumes, the transport cost savings from assembling in South are
larger the greater is the share of South in the world market. Therefore, the break-even point
between a strategy of performing only assembly in South and a strategy of performing all
production activity in South will come at a lower productivity level when the market share
of the South is larger.
When the ﬁxed cost of producing intermediate goods in South is small relative to the
ﬁxed cost of foreign assembly, an integration strategy with production of intermediates in
South and assembly at home will be optimal for ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels.












As the ﬁgure shows, Θ(HH,SH) is an increasing function of σ.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that the
amount that must be shipped to South from an assembly plant in H increases with the share
of the South in the world market. But the associated shipping costs cut into the cost savings
16Θ
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Figure 5: Optimal integration strategiess when t is small and g/f is small
generated by a strategy of foreign production of intermediates, and so a higher productivity
level is needed to justify the higher ﬁxed costs of this strategy.
4.2 Moderate Transport Costs
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When transport costs are in this range, a market in the North can be served at lower per-unit
cost by exports from the South than by local assembly if and only if the intermediate goods
also have been produced in the South. If instead the intermediate goods have been produced
in the North, the home market can be served most cheaply via local assembly.
Again, it is never optimal for a ﬁrm with headquarters in H to produce its intermediate
goods in R. Such a ﬁrm could instead produce the intermediate goods in S and achieve lower
variable costs while incurring the same ﬁxed cost. Thus, all of the integration strategies that
we will consider in this section involve production of intermediates either in H or in S.
A ﬁrm that chooses to produce its intermediate goods in H will serve its home market
with ﬁnal goods that have been assembled there as well, in view of the left-most inequality
in (11). Also, a ﬁrm that chooses to produce its intermediate goods in S will either perform
all of its assembly there or else assemble all ﬁnal goods at home. With intermediate goods
from the South, assembly in South oﬀers the lowest variable cost of serving any market in
17view of the right-most inequality in (11). Thus, a ﬁrm that elects to bear the ﬁxed cost
of FDI in assembly will serve all markets from there. But a ﬁrm may choose to avoid the
ﬁx e dc o s to fF D Ii na s s e m b l yb yp e r f o r m i n gi t sa s s e m b l ya th o m e . W ea r el e f tw i t hs i x
integration strategies to consider when transport costs are moderate: Southern production
of intermediate goods with assembly either in H or in S; or home production of intermediate
g o o d sw i t ha s s e m b l yi nH,i nH and S,i nH and R,o ri nH,S and R.
Let us begin once again, by considering the operating proﬁts that can be achieved by
concentrating all production activities either in H or in S. By performing all activities at
home, a ﬁrm avoids all ﬁxed costs of FDI but bears a very high per-unit cost of tc(1,1) of
serving the markets in R and S, and a reasonably high per-unit cost of c(1,1) of serving the
home market. Nonetheless, this strategy will be attractive to ﬁrms with very low productivity,
because these ﬁrms intend to produce low volumes of output. The associated operating proﬁts
are given by
πH,H =( 1− α)¯ Y Θ
[(1−σ
2 )(1 + T)+σ]
TC(1,1)
.
At the other extreme, by performing all activities in South, a ﬁrm pays a high total ﬁxed
cost of f + g, but it attains the lowest possible per-unit cost of serving each of the markets.
Operating proﬁts then are given by
πS,S =( 1− α)¯ Y Θ
[(1 − σ)+σT]
TC(w,w)
− (f + g) (12)
Such a strategy will appeal to ﬁrms with high productivity that intend to produce great
volumes of output. It follows, as before, that the lowest productivity ﬁrms concentrate their
activities in the home country and the highest productivity ﬁrms perform all production
activities in the low-wage South.
Next consider a strategy that involves production of intermediate goods in the home
country and assembly in H and in at least one other country. If assembly takes place only in
H and R,t h eﬁrm is engaged in horizontal FDI to conserve on shipping costs to this market.
The resulting proﬁts are8
πH,HR(Θ)=( 1− α)¯ Y Θ
[(1 − σ)T + σ]
TC(1,1)
− f .( 1 3 )
If assembly takes place only in H and S,t h eﬁrm uses its plant in S to serve the Southern
market and as an export platform for sales to R. Then operating proﬁts are given by










− f .( 1 4 )
8In this notation, the subscript on π gives the index of the country (or countries) in which the ﬁrm produces
its intermediates followed by a comma and then a list of the countries in which assembly takes place.
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Figure 6: Assembly in multiple plants with moderate transport costs
Finally, if assembly takes place in every country, each market is served by products assembled
locally, and operating proﬁts are given by








− 2f .( 1 5 )
Figure 6 depicts the operating proﬁts for the integration strategies that involve assembly
in more than one location. Of the three, the strategy in which the ﬁrm operates assembly
plants in all three countries has the highest ﬁxed cost and the lowest per-unit variable cost.
The variable costs are low with this strategy, because the ﬁrm avoids all shipping costs.
The strategy is preferred to the other two by ﬁrms with relatively high productivity. The
remaining two strategies entail similar ﬁxed costs of FDI. The ﬁgure shows a case in which a
strategy of assembling in S for sales in S and R generates lower variable costs and therefore
higher operating proﬁts than a strategy of assembling in R for these markets.9 This case
applies whenever the market share of the South is greater than ˆ σH,w h e r e
ˆ σH =
TC(1,w) − C(1,1)
(2T − 1)C(1,1) + (T − 2)C(1,w)
is the critical value of σ at which it is equally proﬁtable to assemble in H and R as it is
to assemble in H and S, when intermediate goods are produced in H.I f σ<ˆ σH,t h e n
9Equivalently, the ﬁrm might assemble in R for sales in R and serve the market in S with exports from H.
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Figure 7: Moderate transport costs, σ>ˆ σH,a n dg/f large
πH,HR >π H,HS for all Θ.
If the proﬁtl i n ef o rπH,H were added to Figure 6, it would be apparent how ﬁrms that
might choose to produce intermediates at home would locate their assembly operations. Those
with low productivity prefer a single assembly plant at home, while those with high produc-
tivity prefer to have assembly plants in all three countries. The ﬁrms with intermediate levels
of productivity prefer to have an assembly operation at home and in one other country; in
the South if σ is large, and in R otherwise.
Now we consider a ﬁrm’s option to produce its intermediates in the South and then
assemble ﬁnal goods in either H or S. If assembly takes place at home, operating proﬁts are
πS,H =( 1− α)¯ Y Θ
·




whereas if assembly takes place in S, the proﬁts are given in (12). Among these two strategies,
ﬁrms with low productivity prefer the former and ﬁrms with high productivity prefer the
latter.
A comparison of strategies involving production of intermediates at home and production
of intermediates in South hinges on the relative sizes of the ﬁxed costs of the two types of
FDI. Take ﬁrst the case with g/f large; i.e., the ﬁxed cost of FDI in assembly is small relative
to the ﬁxed cost of FDI in producing intermediate goods. In drawing Figure 7 we also assume
that σ is suﬃciently large that πH,HS >π H,HR, and we reproduce the proﬁt lines from Figure
6f o rπH,HS and πH,HRS. We show in this ﬁgure as well the proﬁtl i n e sf o rπH,H and πS,S.
20Since the ﬁxed cost g of FDI in producing intermediates is large, the πS,S curve has a low
intercept relative to the curves for πH,HS and πH,HRS. This means that the intersection of
πS,S with πH,HRS comes at a point C to the right of the intersection point B of πH,HS
and πH,HRS. In turn, this means that a range of ﬁrms with relatively high productivity (Θ
greater than the ordinate of point B) but not very high productivity (Θ less than the ordinate
of point C) prefer to produce their intermediates at home and assemble ﬁnal goods in all
three countries than to conduct all activity in South.10 In the ﬁgure, we have suppressed the
proﬁtl i n ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hπS,H;w i t hg/f large, this strategy has a high ﬁxed cost relative to
all strategies except that of conducting all production activities in S, and compared to that
strategy it oﬀers higher variable costs.
We can now describe the optimal integration strategies as a function Θ for the case
illustrated, with t moderate, σ large, and g/f large. Firms with low productivity (Θ less
than the ordinate of point A) perform all activities at home and export ﬁnished goods to
the rest of the world. Firms with somewhat higher productivity (Θ between the ordinate of
points A and B) produce their intermediate goods at home and also conduct assembly at
home for local sales while operating an assembly plant in the South to serve the markets in
S and R.T h e s eﬁrms export intermediate goods to a foreign assembly plant and export ﬁnal
goods from S to R. Firms with still higher productivity (Θ between the ordinate of points
B and C) produce all of their intermediates at home and assemble goods in each country
for local sale. These ﬁrms trade intermediate goods, but not ﬁnal goods. Finally, the most
productive ﬁrms (Θ greater than the ordinate of point C) conduct all production activities
in the low-wage South and use an assembly plant there as a platform for serving all markets.
We can use Figure 8 to discuss how the relative size of the South aﬀects the choice of
integration strategy, still for the case of g/f large. So far, we have described the optimal
strategies for σ just above ˆ σH.A s σ grows still larger, the productivity level at which a
ﬁrm that produces intermediates at home is indiﬀerent between assembling only at home and
assembling at home and in the South decreases, because an increase in the relative size of
the Southern market makes assembly there relatively more proﬁtable for any Θ. Also, an
increase in σ raises the productivity level at which a ﬁrm that produces intermediates at
home is indiﬀerent between assembling in H and S and assembling in all three countries. For
σ large enough, the latter strategy is dominated by one of the others, and there are no ﬁrms
that assemble ﬁnal goods in country R.Al a r g eσ means a relatively small market in country
R, and eventually either the market there is so small that the transport cost savings do not
justify the ﬁxed cost of FDI in this country for even relatively high productivity ﬁrms, or the
market in S is suﬃciently large to warrant shifting all production to this location. Note that
an increase in the size of the South eventually leads to not only more FDI in assembly, but
also to more FDI in the production of intermediate goods. This is true even when, as here,
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Figure 8: Optimal integration strategies with moderate transport costs and g/f large
the intermediate goods can be shipped costlessly. The two types of FDI are complementary,
because when assembly takes place in the South, a larger σ spells lower average transport costs
and thus greater volumes of output at a given productivity level. With more output being
produced, the cost savings promised by the South’s low wages justify FDI in intermediate
goods at lower levels of productivity.
Now consider a Southern market share σ just below ˆ σH. For all σ<ˆ σH, a strategy with
production of intermediate goods at home and assembly in H and S is dominated by one with
production of intermediate goods at home and assembly in H and R.F o rσ slightly less than
ˆ σH, the choice of integration strategies is similar to those for σ just above ˆ σH, except that
some ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels choose to assemble in H and R, rather than
in H and S.A sσ shrinks further, there are fewer ﬁrms that choose to assemble in all three
countries, and for σ below some level, no ﬁrms ﬁnd this to be an optimal strategy. Moreover,
the smaller is the South, the greater is the productivity level needed before a ﬁrm opts to
move all production activity there. The market share of the South also aﬀects the decision of
ﬁrms that manufacture intermediates at home and are choosing between assembling only in
H and assembling in H and in R.A sσ shrinks for given ¯ Y , the size of the markets in H and
R grow. The growth in the size of the home market has no aﬀect on the relative proﬁtability
of these two strategies, but the growth in the size of the market in R favors the strategy with
assembly there. Accordingly, the productivity level at which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
assembly in H and R a n da s s e m b l i n go n l yi nH falls as σ shrinks to zero.
Let us consider brieﬂy an industry with moderate transport costs and g/f small. In this
22case, the ﬁxed cost of FDI for producing intermediate goods is much smaller than that for
FDI in assembly. Since intermediate goods also are costless to ship, all ﬁrms except those
with very low levels of productivity will ﬁnd it optimal to produce their intermediate goods
in the South. In particular, with g/f small, any strategy with production of intermediate
goods at home and assembly in South or in multiple locations is dominated by a strategy
with all production activities concentrated at home or all production activities concentrated
in the South. And any strategy with production of intermediates in the South and assembly
in multiple locations is dominated by one with assembly only at home or only in the South.
It follows that all ﬁrms choose one of three integration strategies: either all activity is
concentrated at home, all activity is concentrated in South, or intermediates are manufactured
in the South and assembled at home. It should be clear by now how ﬁrms with diﬀerent
productivity levels divide among these three alternatives. Those with very low productivity
opt to minimize their ﬁxed costs by conducting all production activities at home. Those with
very high productivity minimize their variable costs by performing all production activities
in the low-wage South. And those with intermediate levels of productivity produce their
intermediate goods in the South and assemble them at home. Compared to the option of
conducting all activity in the South, such ﬁrms accept the relatively high variable cost of
sales to all three markets in order to avoid the relatively large ﬁxed costs of FDI in assembly.
4.3 High Transport Costs
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In such circumstances, the lowest variable cost of serving any market is achieved by local
assembly near to consumers.11
Suppose ﬁrst that g/f is large; i.e., the ﬁxed cost of FDI in producing intermediate goods
is large compared to the ﬁxed cost of FDI in assembly. Then it will not be optimal for any
ﬁrm to produce intermediates in a foreign subsidiary in South and conduct assembly only
at home. Such a strategy is dominated either by producing the intermediates in South and
conducting assembly in every country or by performing all production activities at home. The
same two strategies together dominate one of producing intermediates in S and performing
assembly in H and S, unless σ is close to one. Similarly, no ﬁrm will choose to assemble in
H and R intermediate goods produced in S unless σ is quite small. And, as before, there
exists a critical value of σ (that we have denoted by ˆ σH) at which a strategy of producing
intermediates at home and performing assembly in H and R yields the same operating proﬁts
11Recall that an elasticity of substitution between intermediates and assembly of no more than one ensures
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Figure 9: Optimal integration strategies with large transport costs and g/f large
as one of producing intermediates at home and performing assembly in H and S.
Consider σ slightly below ˆ σH and refer to Figure 9. As usual, ﬁrms with low productivity
can minimize ﬁxed costs by conducting all activities at home. The next lowest ﬁxed cost is
achieved by adding a single assembly plant. Since σ<ˆ σH,e v e r yﬁrm prefers to add such
a plant in R rather than in S. By doing so, it can save on the variable costs of serving the
market in R at the relatively-low ﬁxed cost of f. This strategy will be chosen by ﬁrms that
have productivity levels that are low but not quite as low as those that choose to stay entirely
at home. Still more productive ﬁrms will add an assembly plant in S so as to reduce the
variable costs of serving that country’s market. Finally, the most productive ﬁrms are willing
to pay the high ﬁxed cost g of opening a subsidiary to produce intermediate goods in South.
These ﬁrms assemble the intermediates from S in separate plants located near consumers,
thereby minimizing the variable cost of serving every market.
Now let us reduce the relative size of the market in S. Since we maintain the assumption
that the two Northern countries are symmetric, a fall in σ increases the size of R. Accordingly,
the productivity level at which a ﬁrm is willing to open an assembly operation in R falls. Also,
as σ falls, so does the proﬁtability of operating an assembly plant in S. The productivity
level at which a ﬁrm that produces its intermediates in H is indiﬀerent between performing
assembly only in H and R and doing so also in S rises, until eventually a value of σ is reached
such that no ﬁrm that produces intermediates in H assembles ﬁnal goods in the South. When
σ is quite small, even a ﬁrm that produces intermediates in S will not opt to assemble there
unless θ is very large. Rather, for σ small, there exists a range of quite high productivity
240 Θ
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Figure 10: Optimal integration strategies with large transport costs and g/f small
levels at which ﬁrms produce their intermediates in S and assembly them only in the two
Northern countries. These ﬁrms serve the small Southern market with exports from one or
the other of their Northern plants.
The portion of Figure 9 that applies for σ>ˆ σH can be understood similarly. Since we
believe that most industries of interest have relatively large markets in the North, we will
not go through the analysis in detail. Suﬃce it to say that, with g/f large, only the most
productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it worthwhile to produce intermediates in the South. And only the
least productive ﬁrms do not want to serve at least the larger of the two foreign markets–if
not both–with goods produced in an assembly plant located near consumers. The lowest
variable cost is achieved by producing intermediates in the South and assembling them in all
three countries. Thus, a highly productive ﬁrm will opt for such a strategy despite the high
ﬁxed costs of g +2 f that are entailed.
It remains to discuss an industry with high transport costs and g/f small. The optimal
strategies for ﬁrms in such an industry are shown in Figure 10. Since the ﬁxed cost of
FDI for producing intermediates is relatively low, only the least productive ﬁrms opt to
manufacture their intermediate goods at home. Those with productivity just above these
low levels produce intermediates in the South and export them from S to an assembly plant
in their home country. Such a strategy involves a relatively low ﬁxed cost of g, but entails
relatively high variable costs of serving the markets in R and S due to the high transport
costs. Accordingly, more productive ﬁrms will opt to open an assembly plant abroad; in R
25if σ<ˆ σS and in S otherwise.12 Finally, the most productive ﬁrms operate assembly plants
in both R and S.T h e s eﬁrms export intermediate goods from S to H and to R, but do not
trade any of their ﬁnal products.
The slopes of the various boundary lines in the ﬁgure are easy to understand in the
light of the previous discussion. For example, the boundary between (S,H) and (S,HS)
is downward sloping in the region with σ>ˆ σS, because the proﬁtability of an assembly
plant in S increases with an increase in South’s market share. Similarly, for σ<ˆ σS,t h e
boundary between (S,H) and (S,HR) slopes upward, because an increase in σ corresponds
to a decrease in the relative size of R and so ﬁrms require a higher level of productivity to
justify placing an assembly plant there. The slopes of the boundaries between (S,HS) and
(S,HRS) and between (S,HR) and (S,HRS) have analogous explanations.
4.4 Transport Costs and FDI When the South is Small
In this section, we highlight the relationship between the cost of transporting ﬁnal goods and
the integration strategies chosen by multinational ﬁrms in situations where the market in the
South is small. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the case where σ =0and review systematically how
changes in t aﬀect the relative prevalence of diﬀerent organizational forms.
We consider ﬁrst the case in which g/f is large; i.e., the ﬁxed cost of FDI in intermediate
production is large relative to the ﬁxed cost of FDI in assembly. When transport costs are
small and σ =0 , the optimal integration strategies for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels
are shown along the horizontal axis of Figure 4. We see that ﬁrms with low productivity
conduct all activity at home, ﬁrms with intermediate productivity produce intermediate
goods in H and assemble ﬁnal goods in S,w h i l eﬁrms with high productivity conduct all
production activity in the South. As the cost of transport rises but still remains in the range
where t<t m ≡ c(1,1)/c(1,w), the boundary Θ(HH,HS) at which the ﬁrst two of these
strategies are equally proﬁtable shifts to the right, as does the boundary Θ(HS,SS) at which
the last two strategies are equally proﬁtable. An increase in transport cost favors assembly at
home relative to assembly in the South, because the Southern market is small and shipments
from South to Home become more expensive as t rises. Thus, equal proﬁtability occurs at
a higher productivity level when t is a bit larger compared to when t is close to one. The
rightward shift of Θ(HS,SS) reﬂects that output of ﬁnal goods is larger when intermediate
goods are produced in the South as compared to when they are produced in the higher-cost
North. Therefore, an increase in transport costs for ﬁnal goods has a larger impact on the
proﬁtability of a ﬁrm that conducts all of its production activities in the South than it does
on one that only performs assembly there.
We use γi,j to denote the fraction of ﬁrms that produce intermediate goods in country
12We use ˆ σS to denote the critical value of σ at which it is equally proﬁtable to assemble in H and R as it
is to assemble in H and S, when intermediate goods are produced in the South.
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Figure 11: Relative prevalence of organizational forms when σ =0and g/f is large
i and assemble ﬁnal goods in the set of countries {j}. Evidently, a rise in t increases γH,H
for t<t m, as shown in panel (a) of Figure 11. Also, γS,S falls, as shown by the broken
curve in panel (b). The fraction of ﬁrms that produce intermediate goods in the North and
assemble in the South can rise or fall, since this organizational form gains at the expense
of integrated production in the South but loses at the expense of integrated production in
the North. However, it can readily be shown that γH,S must fall as t rises when the size
distribution of productivity levels is characterized by a Pareto distribution.13 This is shown
in panel (c).
Next suppose that t rises above tm.F o r t ≥ tm,aﬁrm that produces its intermediate
goods in H can earn higher proﬁts by performing assembly in H and R than by performing
assembly in S. The integration strategies used by ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels
are shown along the horizontal axis of Figure 8. Firms with low productivity conduct all
activity at home, ﬁrms with intermediate productivity produce intermediate goods at home
and assemble in H and R,a n dﬁrms with high productivity conduct all production activity
in the South. Further increases in t for tm <t≤ th ≡ c(w,1)/c(w,w) cause a contraction in
the fraction of ﬁrms with all production activities in H or S, and an expansion in the fraction
of ﬁrms that assemble in both H and R.T h u s , γH,H and γS,S fall while γH,HR rises with
13With a Pareto distribution of θ, the fraction of ﬁrms that have productivity less than θ is given by
G(θ)=1− (˜ b/θ)
˜ k for θ ≥ ˜ b>0 and ˜ k>1. We show in the appendix that with this distribution the share
γH,S is a declining function of transport costs when g/f is large.
The Pareto distribution is commonly used to describe the size distribution of productivity levels. Axtell
(2001) provides evidence that such a distribution ﬁts well the data on the distribution of sales by U.S. ﬁrms.
Helpman et al. (2003) show that a Pareto distribution of ﬁrm sizes emerges from a Pareto distribution of
productivity measures.
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Figure 12: Relative prevalence of organizational forms when σ =0and g/f is small
increases in transport costs in this range, as shown in panels (a), (b) and (d) of Figure 8.
Finally, for high transport costs such that t>t h, the optimal integration strategies are
s h o w ni nF i g u r e9 .F o rt ≥ th, no assembly is performed in the South. Now, even the ﬁrms
with high productivity that produce intermediates in S ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to assemble
their ﬁnal goods close to consumers. The low productivity ﬁrms perform all activities at
home, the ﬁrms with intermediate productivity manufacture intermediate goods at home and
assemble them in H and R, and the high productivity ﬁrms produce intermediate goods in
the South and assemble in H and R. Further increases in transport costs continue to shrink
the range of productivities for which it is most proﬁtable to have a fully integrated facility
in the home country and serve R by exports. However, the productivity level at which it is
equally proﬁtable to produce intermediates in H or S, with assembly in each case in H and
R, is unaﬀected by changes in t, inasmuch as neither of these strategies involves any trade in
ﬁnal goods. Figure 8 shows γH,H falling, γS,HR ﬂat, and γH,HR rising for t ≥ th.
Overall, increases in transport costs for ﬁnal goods cause production activities to shift
away from the South. Assembly operations in the South are replaced by assembly operations
closer to consumers. And production of intermediate goods in the South contracts in favor
of production at home, inasmuch as the strategies that involve intermediate production in
the South also involve high volumes of output and so are especially vulnerable to increases
in the cost of transporting ﬁnal goods.
We turn brieﬂyt ot h ec a s eo fg/f small. When the ﬁxed cost of FDI in assembly
is relatively large, the same three integration strategies are observed in equilibrium for all
t<t h; ﬁrms with low productivity conduct all activities at home, ﬁrms with intermediate
productivity produce intermediate goods in a subsidiary in the South but perform assembly
28at home, and ﬁrms with high productivity perform all production activities in the South. An
increase in t for t<t h causes both Θ(HH,SH) and Θ(SH,SS) to shift to the right. The
range of ﬁrms that performs all activity at home expands, because a ﬁrm that manufactures its
intermediate goods in the South will choose to produce more output than one with similarly
productivity that manufactures these goods at home, so the rise in the cost of transporting
ﬁnal goods from H to R will impact more strongly the multinational ﬁrms. A strategy of
integrated production in the South becomes less proﬁtable, because this strategy involves
the transport of ﬁnal goods to markets in both H and R.T h u s ,a st grows, γH,H rises and
γS,S falls, as shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 12. The fraction of ﬁrms that produces
intermediate goods in the South and assembles them at home may rise or fall with an arbitrary
distribution of productivity levels; but it must decline if θ has a Pareto distribution, as shown
in panel (c) of Figure 12.14
For t>t h, any strategy with assembly in the South is dominated by one with assembly in
H and R. Thus, for transport costs in this range, ﬁrms with low productivity concentrate all
activity at home, ﬁrms with intermediate productivity produce intermediates in the South
and assemble at home, and ﬁrms with high productivity manufacture intermediate goods in
the South and conduct assembly near to their markets in H and R. A further increase in t
expands the range of productivity levels for which ﬁrms concentrate all activities at home, as
well as that for which assembly in H and R is optimal; thus, γH,H and γS,HR increase with t,
while γS,H declines, as shown in Figure 12. As t rises, the fraction of multinational ﬁrms falls
monotonically, as production of intermediate goods in South gives way to production of these
goods at home, and assembly in the South gives way to assembly at home and ultimately to
assembly in both Northern markets.
5 Transport Costs for Intermediate Goods
U pu n t i ln o w ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a ti n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sc a nb em o v e dc o s t l e s s l yt oa n yp l a c e
of assembly. This simplifying assumption allowed us to examine how variations in the cost
of transporting ﬁnal goods, in relative market size, and in the relative ﬁxed costs of FDI in
diﬀerent activities aﬀect ﬁrms’ decisions about global integration. We have seen that, with
variations in productivity in an industry, rich patterns of trade and FDI are possible.
In this section, we introduce a cost of trading intermediate inputs. To avoid a detailed
taxonomy, however, we explore only cases in which the cost of transporting intermediates
goods is high. Such costs give ﬁrms an incentive to locate the production of intermediate
goods near to where they intend to perform their assembly activities. We also assume that
the South is negligible in size (σ =0 ), so that ﬁrms are not motivated to locate their assembly
operations in S in order to serve the Southern market. Rather, if a ﬁrm opens an assembly
14See the appendix for a derivation of this result.
29plant in the South, it is because it wishes to use such a plant as an export platform.
Recall that τ captures the cost of shipping intermediate goods; τ>1 units of the good
must be shipped from a production facility in some country to deliver one unit of the good to
an assembly plant in another country. The sense in which we assume that τ is large is that
wc(τ,1) >c (1,1) .( 1 7 )
This restriction implies that τw>1; i.e., it is more costly to produce the intermediate good
in South and ship it to the North than it is to manufacture the good in East or West.15 Also,
it implies that c(τ,w) >c (1,1);i . e . ,aﬁnal good assembled in S with intermediates imported
from the North has a greater per-unit cost than one produced and assembled entirely in a
single Northern country.16
With high costs of transporting intermediate goods and a small market in the South, many
integration strategies can be ruled out. First, no ﬁrm with its headquarters in H will have a
sole assembly plant in country R. Any such strategy is dominated by an alternative one with
all production activities undertaken at home.17 Second, no ﬁrm will maintain assembly plants
in all three countries, inasmuch as the plant in the South would then serve only the negligible
Southern market and thus would not cover its ﬁxed costs. Third, if a ﬁrm has assembly
plants in H and R, it will not produce intermediates only in R. Instead, it could produce
intermediates only in H, achieve the same total variable costs and conserve on ﬁxed costs.
Fourth, a ﬁrm with assembly plants in H and R will not produce any intermediate goods
in S, because delivery from S involves higher costs than local production near an assembly
plant and entails ﬁxed costs that are at least as large. Taken together, these observations
imply that any ﬁrm with an assembly operation in R will also have one in H,a n dt h a ts u c h
a ﬁrm will produce intermediate goods either only in H or in H and R. The resulting proﬁts
are πH,HR or πHR,HR,a st h ec a s em a yb e .
Four other strategies seem viable at this point. First, a ﬁrm may assemble only in S.
But then it will produce its intermediates in S as well, because a strategy with intermediates
produced in H or R and assembled in S is dominated by one with all production activities
in H, inasmuch as (17) implies c(τ,w) >c (1,1). Second, a ﬁrm may assemble only in H.
Then it will produce its intermediate goods in H as well, to conserve on both shipping costs
and ﬁxed costs. Finally, a ﬁrm may operate assembly plants in H and S, the former to serve
the home market and the latter to serve the market in R. If so, it will produce intermediates
15Note that wc(τ,1) = c(τw,w).T h e nc(τw,w) >c (1,1) and w<1 implies τw>1.
16Note that c(τ,w) >c (τw,w)=wc(τ,1).
17If the sole assembly plant is in R, there would be no reason to have multiple plants producing intermediate
goods. Then a strategy of producing intermediates in S and assembling in R is dominated by one with all
production activities in R, because τw >1. And a strategy with all production in R or one with production
of intermediates in H and assembly in R is dominated by one with all production in H; the latter strategy
yields variable costs that are no higher (in view of the symmetry of the two countries) and conserves on ﬁxed
costs of FDI.
30either in S only, or in H and S.18 The four strategies that do not involve assembly in R yield
potential proﬁts of πS,S, πH,H, πS,HS,a n dπHS,HS, respectively.
The optimal choices among the remaining strategies will depend on the sizes of the ﬁxed
costs of FDI in intermediates and assembly, the cost of transporting ﬁnal goods, and the





.( 1 8 )
This implies tc(w,w) <c (1,1) or that the variable cost of serving any Northern market from
an integrated production and assembly plant in the South is less than the cost of serving
t h es a m em a r k e tf r o ma na s s e m b l yp l a n ti nt h eN o r t h . 19 Thus, πS,S(θ) >π HS,HS(θ) >
πHR,HR(θ) and πS,S(θ) >π S,HS(θ)for all θ. Moreover, (17) and (18) together imply tc(1,1) <
c(τ,1),s ot h a tπH,H(θ) >π H,HR(θ). In other words, the only viable integration strategies
when t is small are ones with all production activities concentrated either in South or at home.
Relatively productive ﬁrms will prefer the former strategy with its lower variable costs, while
less productive ﬁrms prefer the latter strategy with its lower ﬁxed costs. Evidently, the high
cost of transporting intermediate goods dictates the optimal strategy for integration, which
must involve production of intermediate goods and assembly in the same location.






.( 1 9 )
With t>1/w, a strategy of integrated production and assembly in both H and R oﬀers
higher proﬁts to any ﬁrm than one of concentrating all production in the South, operating
integrated production and assembly operations in both H and S, and producing intermediates
in S with assembly in H and S. This is so, because all of these strategies entail the same ﬁxed
cost f + g and with relatively costly transport of intermediate and ﬁnal goods it is better to
assemble output near to consumers than to ship output from the South.
The right-most inequality in (19) implies that the variable cost of supplying the market
in R with goods produced entirely in H is less than the variable cost of serving that market
with goods assembled there with intermediates imported from H. This in turn implies that
πH,H(θ) >π H,HR(θ), since concentrating production in H also conserves on ﬁxed costs.
Thus, the only viable strategies when t satisﬁes (19) are ones with an integrated production
and assembly operation only in H or with such integrated operations both in H and in R.
18If assembly is peformed in H and S, a strategy with production of intermediates only in R or in R and S
is dominated by one with production only in H or in H and S, respectively. A strategy with intermediates
produced in H and R is dominated by one with intermediates produced in H and S. And no ﬁrm will choose
to produce intermediates only in H and assemble in H or S, because with intermediates eminating only from
H the ﬁrm could earn higher proﬁts by serving the market in R from an assembly plant located there.















Figure 13: Optimal integration stragies when τ is large and σ =0
The former strategy is preferred by ﬁrms with relatively low productivity, the latter by ﬁrms
with relatively high productivity.





it may be optimal for some ﬁr m st oa s s e m b l eg o o d si nR with intermediate inputs imported
from H. As before, t>1/w eliminates from consideration all strategies with assembly opera-
tions in S. So, the three viable strategies for t satisfying (20) yield operating proﬁts of πH,H,
πH,HR,a n dπHR,HR.T h e ﬁrst of these minimizes the ﬁxed costs while the last minimizes
the variable costs of serving both markets. A strategy of assembly in R with intermediates
produced in H conserves on ﬁxed costs relative to one with intermediates produced in H
and R, but it generates a higher variable cost of serving the market in R. Accordingly, ﬁrms
with low productivity will conduct all activity in H, ﬁrms with intermediate productivity
will assemble ﬁnal goods in H and R but produce intermediate goods only in H,a n dﬁrms
with high productivity will operate integrated production and assembly facilities in both H
and R.
Figure 13 summarizes the discussion in this section and also indicates how the choices of
a ﬁrm with a given productivity level are aﬀected by the size of the transport cost for ﬁnal
goods. For t<1/w, the greater is the transport cost the higher must be a ﬁrm’s productivity
before it will choose to shift operations to the South. For t i nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t er a n g e ,t h e
32greater are transport costs the lower is the productivity level at which a ﬁrm will open an
integrated production facility in R.A n dﬁnally, for t large, the greater are transport costs, the
lower is the productivity level at which a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between maintaining an assembly
plant in R and not in H. The cost of shipping ﬁnal goods has no bearing on ﬁrms’ decision
whether to produce intermediate goods in H only, or in H and R, since this decision applies
to ﬁrms that are not trading ﬁnal goods in any case.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have examined the joint determination of international trade and foreign
direct investment in a setting in which ﬁrms may choose among a rich array of integration
strategies. In our analysis, ﬁrms that are headquartered in a Northern country supply
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods to two national markets in the North and one in the South. Each
such ﬁrm must produce an intermediate input and conduct assembly activities in order to
generate a ﬁnal product. The ﬁrms may produce intermediate goods in their home country,
in the other Northern country, or in the South. Similarly, assembly may take place in
any of the three locations. And ﬁrms may choose to maintain plants for either or both
stages of production in multiple locations. Accordingly, there are many possible choices of
organizational forms available to ﬁrms. Each such choice has implications for the pattern of
trade in intermediate and ﬁnal goods.
We characterized industries by the size of the ﬁxed costs of maintaining a foreign sub-
sidiary for production of intermediate goods and for assembly, the cost of transporting in-
termediate and ﬁnal goods internationally, and the fraction of the consumer demand that
resides in the low-wage South. For each industry, we derived the equilibrium organizational
forms of heterogeneous ﬁrms that diﬀer in their productivity.
In an industry in which transportation of intermediate and ﬁnal goods is costless, the rel-
a t i v es i z eo fﬁxed costs for foreign investment in intermediate goods and assembly determines
the set of organizational ﬁrms that are observed in equilibrium. Here, the relative sizes of
the markets have no bearing on the equilibrium choices, and there is no intra-industry FDI.
Firms with low productivity choose an integration strategy that minimize the ﬁxed cost of
operation, whereas ﬁrms with high productivity seek to minimize variable costs of serving
the various markets.
When ﬁnal goods are costly to transport, relative country size plays a role in determining
the viable multinational strategies. Generally, the larger is the consumer market in the South,
the greater is the fraction of ﬁrms that maintain subsidiaries there, not only for performing
assembly but also for producing intermediate goods. Also, the higher are transport costs
for ﬁnal goods, the greater is the fraction of ﬁrms that performs assembly in two or more
locations. Finally, costly transport of intermediate goods can make it attractive for a ﬁrm to
33produce intermediate goods in multiple locations. In all cases, the attractiveness of alternative
locations for each stage of production depends upon the choices contemplated for the other.
One limitation of our analysis in this paper is that we take the boundaries of the ﬁrm
as given. That is, we have simply assumed that ﬁrms must produce their own intermedi-
ate goods and perform assembly in-house. In other recent work (Grossman and Helpman,
2002, 2003, 2004) two of us have studied how contracting problems interact with factor-price
diﬀerentials and transport costs to determine which activities are outsourced and which per-
formed within a ﬁrms’ corporate boundaries. In those papers, the range of strategies open
to the multinational ﬁrm was substantially narrower than here. Ultimately, we would like
a theory that simultaneously explains the make-or-buy decision and the organization of the
multinational ﬁrm. Such a theory could help explain the broad range of corporate strategies
that are found in the ﬁrm-level data.
34Appendix
DERIVATIONS FOR SECTION 3
From (4) and (5) we ﬁnd that πH,H = πS,S for the productivity level
Θ(HH,SS)=
f + g























from (6) and (8). It follows that πH,S(Θ(HH,SS)) >π H,H(Θ(HH,SS)) i fa n do n l yi f( 7 )
holds, and πS,H(Θ(HH,SS)) >π H,H(Θ(HH,SS)) if and only if (9) holds.
From πH,H = πH,S and equations (4) and (6) we have
Θ(HH,HS)=
f





We can derive in similar fashion
Θ(HH,SH)=
g



















DERIVATIONS FOR SECTION 4.1
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Since C(w,w) <C (1,1), this inequality is satisﬁed for σ<1/3, that is, when the typical
market in the North is larger than in the South. Furthermore, Θ(HH,SS) is decreasing in
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36We can derive Θ(HH,HS) from πH,H = πH,S, which yields
Θ(HH,HS)=
f
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implying that Θ(HH,HS) is decreasing in σ. Similarly, we ﬁnd that Θ(HS,SS) is
Θ(HS,SS)=
g
(1 − α)¯ Y
·
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which is decreasing in σ.
DERIVATIONS FOR SECTION 4.2
Equating πH,HR and πH,HS we obtain
(1 − α)¯ Y Θ
[(1 − σ)T + σ]
TC(1,1)














(2T − 1)C(1,1) + (T − 2)C(1,w)
.
Similarly, equating πS,HR and πS,HS yields
(1 − α)¯ Y Θ
[(1 − σ)T + σ]
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DERIVATIONS FOR SECTION 4.4
When the productivity draws θ have a Pareto distribution, the distribution of produc-
tivity among the population of ﬁrms who remain in the market is also Pareto, and so is the
distribution of Θ among these ﬁrms. Let the distribution of Θ be 1 − (b/Θ)
k,w h e r eΘ ≥ b

































This expression is decreasing in T.


























































































































































































The left hand side is bounded away from zero and inﬁnity as long as T ≤
C(w,1)
C(w,w).T h i s
range includes the moderate transport cost region. It follows that for g/f small enough the
derivative is negative.
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